Split Loyalties:
Mixed Migration and the Diaspora Connection

An analysis of Somali and Afghan Diasporas in Denmark and their connections to the new wave of mixed migration

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Contents

Abstract

The findings of this report are based on 12 focus group discussions (FGDs) with Afghan and Somali diaspora members in Denmark, discussing their views on current irregular migration[1] flows to Europe. It is important to keep in mind that (1) based on the limited number of respondents from only two diasporas, the findings in this paper represent an interesting, but initial indication of diaspora attitudes toward mixed migration; and (2) that responses were given for a particular geographic context for both country of origin and country of residence. As regards the latter, at the time of data gathering, the situation in Denmark for Somalis with subsidiary protection status was precarious, with a large number of residence permits being reassessed by the Danish authorities with a view of potential revocation. This was a repeating topic at the FGDs, and will most likely have influenced attitudes towards new arrivals.

The term diaspora refers to migrants including refugees and asylum seekers as well as their descendants, living outside their country of birth or ancestry yet still maintaining meaningful emotional and material ties to that country.[2] It also includes an aspect of time, distinguishing between well-established, 'old' diasporas and more recent arrivals. Both constitute part of the diaspora, but will have differing attitudes to migration trends, the situation in country of origin etc.

The term migrant refers to people who have moved from their habitual place of residence, regardless of motivation and legal status, including refugees and asylum seekers protected under the 1951 Refugee Convention, as well as people moving through informal or irregular means, leaving their homes in search of a better future in more affluent parts of the world. The prevalence of individuals moving in such a manner along similar routes, using similar means of travel, but for different reasons has led to the term mixed migration. People in mixed migration flows include refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims of trafficking, stranded migrants, etc.; many of them attempting the journeys or part of the journey in an irregular manner being subjected to severe protection risks, and potential violations of human rights. Such has been the focus of this study: interviews and surveys conducted with diaspora informants focussed on their perception of and relation with migrants including refugees in mixed migration flows, facing serious protection issues and abuses along the route. Quotes from diaspora informants for this study convey stories of situations where they were requested to offer lifesaving financial support, pay ransom, etc., painting a bleak picture of the clandestine journeys undertaken by those moving in mixed migration flows. This paper aims at representing views of the people interviewed as accurately and relevantly as possible. Throughout the paper the term 'migrants' is used to refer to all those moving in mixed migration flows, including refugees and asylum seekers, while fully acknowledging the specific legal protection framework that applies to refugees.

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1   Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries.

2   IOM, 2013. Diasporas and Development: Bridging Societies and States. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Available at: <http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/idm/workshops/IDM-2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference/DMC_Final_Conference_Report.pdf> (last accessed: 05/06/2017).

Summary of Key Findings

The relationship between diasporas and migrants in mixed migration flows is poorly understood, with little research and understanding of how diaspora perceive and influence mixed migration. This paper attempts to address the gap by exploring the linkages between the Somali and Afghan diasporas in Denmark and Somali and Afghan migrants in mixed migration flows. It focuses on better understanding the attitudes of diasporas toward current mixed migration trends, and on identifying the variety of roles played by diasporas (financial, social, and other) in the process of mixed migration movements, before departure, during the journey, and upon arrival. It concludes with some suggestions for the future roles of diasporas in policy development and practical programming to improve the protection context for people on the move in mixed flows.

The paper focuses on two countries of origin: Afghanistan and Somalia. These countries were chosen for five reasons: (1) Both countries are affected by chronic, long term conflict. In both countries, the critical drivers of displacement and migration – lack of personal and political security and lack of livelihoods opportunity[3] – are prevalent. (2) The flows from both countries of migrants and refugees continue to be significant. Recognising the link between internal displacement, refugee movements and other forms of onward movement including irregular migration, Afghans and Somalis have undertaken journeys to reach third countries for many years.[4] (3) Due both to the long-standing (over 20 years) arrival of migrants including refugees from these countries into Europe, and to the strong cultural identity of each community, both Afghans and Somalis have strong diaspora networks within Europe, and these networks interact regularly with those who are considering migrating or who have already started the journey. (4) Somali and Afghan diaspora have similar linkages with Denmark. Each diaspora group has relatively long history in Denmark (over 15 years), the size of the diaspora communities is significant, with over 21,000 Somalis and over 18,000 Afghans, living in Denmark,[5] and Somalis and Afghans face similar integration opportunities and challenges.[6] (5) Through its Diaspora Programme,[7] DRC has built a solid relationship with the Afghan and Somali diasporas in Denmark; enabling this in-depth qualitative study towards an improved understanding of the dynamics within the respective diasporas. In this sense, DRC has invested in

developing the necessary long-term relationships with the diasporas; a precondition to build a meaningful collaboration and to foster and encourage information-sharing between DRC and the Afghan and Somali diasporas.

Key findings of the study indicate:

- **Conflicting attitudes:** Afghan and Somali diaspora participants in this research report conflicting attitudes toward the more recent movement and arrival of migrants in mixed migration flows. On the one hand, diasporas acknowledge and have strong sympathy for the conditions in the home country, but on the other hand, there is distrust toward new arrivals and concern about their background. These conflicting attitudes affect interaction between diasporas and new arrivals.

- **The threat of new arrivals:** The perception that new arrivals may pose a threat – particularly that they may generate more racism or more tension with the overall Danish community – may have an effect on the two diaspora's attitudes toward new arrivals.

- **Pre-travel contact between migrants and diaspora:** The role of diasporas in providing information to potential migrants is generally assumed to be strong, and it is presumed that links between diasporas and those residing in the country of origin theoretically generate conversations about routes, risks and experiences. However, the qualitative data collected through this research, though small in scale and thus only indicative, points towards precisely the opposite. Communication between established diasporas and people considering to move is characterized by two dynamics:
  - There is limited communication about what is involved in migrating before the migration journey starts, despite any ongoing communication about other matters between diaspora and potential migrants. The main source of information for potential migrants are smugglers, and diasporas believe that smugglers try to limit access to information from other sources;
  - Diaspora messages about difficult conditions in Europe are not considered reliable by migrants, and are contradicted by the more positive images often related by more recent arrivals.[8]

- **Financing migration**: The attitude of most respondents, across both Afghans and Somalis, concerning the provision of financial support for

3   Cummings, Pacitto, Lauro and Foresti, 2015. Why People Move: Understanding the Drivers and Trends of Migration to Europe. London: Overseas Development Institute. Available at: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10157.pdf> (last accessed: 12/06/2017).

4   Nyberg–Sørensen, Van Hear, and Engberg–Pedersen, 2002. "The Migration–Development Nexus Evidence and Policy Options State–of–the–Art Overview." International Migration 40(5). Available at: <http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_dev_nexus.pdf >.

5   From Statistics Denmark (http://www.statbank.dk). Figures include first generation of descendants.

6   https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/somalis-copenhagen-20141031.pdf.

7   Danish Refugee Council's (DRC) Diaspora Programme has been implementing projects that facilitate, support and enhance diaspora engagement in development and humanitarian assistance since 2010. Somalia and Afghanistan have been main focus countries throughout this period, developing strong and sustainable relationships between DRC and the Afghan and Somali diasporas in Denmark. More information available at www.drc.dk/diaspora.

8   This being one point where above mentioned time aspect of recent vs. established diasporas will influence attitudes and behaviours.

migration was clear – they would not support migrants before departure, but would pay under extreme circumstances, often when their kinsmen were in physical / mortal danger while en route.

- According to FGD respondents, the attitude of the diasporas – that financial support will only be made available under duress – has been instrumentalised by smugglers. Smugglers ensure that diaspora members are only contacted when the migrant's condition is dire, to ensure that they get the most out of this contact.

• **The pressure of obligations:** Respondents experience a dilemma in their relations with potential migrants. They perceive it as their responsibility to inform about the risks along the route, but they feel they are not considered to be credible sources of information, based on perceptions of them already having achieved security through successful migration, but now warning others not to migrate. Respondent diasporas also considered that migrants on the move don't take their advice seriously because the diasporas no longer have an accurate picture/ memory of the insecurity in their home countries. Similarly, in terms of cultural, family and community obligations, diaspora members participating in this survey perceive that it is not their role to financially support movement, but they are compelled to do so both by social pressure and also by a sense of moral and humanitarian obligations.

• **The role of diasporas in influencing migration:** Despite above findings on communication and the limitations hereof, diasporas do consider that they have a role in preventing abuses *en route*, informing about (the risks of) irregular migration, and improving the protection environment for migrants. They have practical recommendations for how to assist in programming and how to contribute to informed migration decisions.

The paper is based on a literature review and on FGDs conducted in Denmark with members of the Afghan and Somali diaspora. Fifty people participated in 12 FGDs (27 Somalis in 6 FGDs and 23 Afghans in 6 FGDs) of which 28 participants were female and 22 were male. Due to the limited sample size, potential sample bias and contextual and policy factors, the results of this primary research should only be considered as indicative; they should provide suggestions for future research.

Introduction

In Europe, there has been an intense focus on mixed migration in light of the significant number of people using the Eastern Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean routes to reach Greece and Italy respectively – mostly as a springboard for onward movement into central and northern Europe. In 2016, a total of 362,376 individuals were recorded arriving in Europe along those routes.[9] With first time asylum applications in Europe totalling 1.2 million in 2016[10] and 429,345[11] in 2017 to date, there is much to suggest hundreds of thousands more entered Europe unrecorded or clandestinely.[12] The Eastern Mediterranean route relates to movement from Turkey to Greece and has been predominantly used, inter alia, by Afghans, Syrians, Iraqis and Pakistanis. The Central Mediterranean route includes the sea crossing from Libya to Italy, and is the main route for Somali, Nigerians and Eritreans, as well as other nationals from sub-Sahara Africa (both West and East Africa) and, since 2017, Bangladeshis. There are also a number of people departing from Egypt's northern coast, also normally arriving in Italy.

There is evidence from a number of sources[13] that diasporas interact with migrants before and during the journey, as well as upon arrival. The precise nature of these interactions and how they differ between migration flows and between diasporas of the same origin living in different countries of residence remains largely unexamined. Furthermore, how they specifically affect diaspora perceptions and migrant decisions is still also unclear.

This paper represents an initial attempt to examine the links between Somali and Afghan diaspora located in Denmark to mixed migration flows. Somalia and Afghanistan represent two of the most protracted and largest displacements of the modern era, with over 1 million displaced Somalis and 2.5 million displaced Afghans.[14] Although Denmark is not among the top hosting countries for either of these populations, it has sizable and relatively long-standing Somali and Afghan diaspora communities. Currently over 18,000 Afghans and over 21,000 Somalis reside in Denmark, including the first generation of descendants. Both communities consist predominantly of those who have achieved refugee status, and although both communities have received significant

9   All figures are from UNHCR Mediterranean Portal <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php> unless otherwise noted.

10   http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-press-releases/-/3-16032017-BP

11   Eurostat Quarterly Report: Asylum and First Time Applicants Monthly Data, <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>

12   This was predicted by various commentators including the Overseas Development Institute in their 2016 Europe's Refugees and Migrants report. Available at: <https://www.odi.org/publications/10558-europe-s-refugees-and-migrants-hidden-flows-tightened-borders-and-spiralling-costs> (last accessed: 12/06/2017).

13   Such as (referenced later in the paper: Rift Valley Institute, 2016. Going on Tahriib; The Causes and Consequences of Somali Youth Migration to Europe. Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute; Frouws et al, 2016. Getting to Europe the Whatsapp Way: The Use of ICT in Contemporary Mixed Migration Flows to Europe. Available at: < http://regionalmms.org/images/briefing/ Social_Media_in_Mixed_Migration. pdf > (last accessed: 12/06/17). Crisp, 1999. Policy Challenges of the New Diasporas: Migrant Networks and their Impact on Asylum Flows and Regimes. Transnational Communities Programme: Working Paper Series. Jacobsen, Robinson and Lijnders, 2013. Ransom, Collaborators, Corruption: Sinai Trafficking and Transnational Networks, A Case Study of the Eritrean Migration System from Eritrea to Israel. Medford: Feinstein International Center. Available at: <http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Ransom-Collaborate-Corrupt-8-12.pdf> (last accessed: 12/06/17).

14   UNHCR global trends report (http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf)

social support, there are also barriers to integration including discrimination, negative media, challenges in finding jobs and challenges overcoming language barriers.

Somalis started coming to Denmark in high numbers in the 1990s and Afghans in the early 2000s.[15] Today, there are 21,204 Somalis and 18,379 Afghans living in Denmark – this including both initial migrants and refugees as well as first generation decedents. About 40 per cent of Somalis and Afghans in Denmark between 30-64 years old are employed, a rate which is significantly lower than the average employment rate in Denmark which is at 75 per cent. The highest unemployment rates are seen among women. However, second generation Afghan and Somali diaspora have higher employment rates. There is no official explanation to this, but better integration and education are considered to be some of the main factors.

Somali and Afghan asylum seekers in Denmark

Number of asylum applications from Afghan and Somali asylum seekers in Denmark 2012-2016:					
Nationality	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Afghan	577	426	313	2,331	1,127
Somali	919	965	683	257	258

Percentage of recognized Afghan and Somali asylum seekers in by the Danish Immigration ministry 2012 – 2016:					
Nationality	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Afghan	26%	42%	37%	38%	26%
Somali	93%	58%	54%	44%	31%

All figures derive from the Danish Ministry for Immigration and Integration and can be retrieved at: https://www.nyidanmark.dk/da-dk/Statistik/Search-Statistics.htm?SearchType=statistics&Keywords=udl%C3%A6ndingeom-r%C3%A5det&SubType=Tal%20og%20fakta

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15   All statistics presented in this paragraph are from Danish Statistics' 2016 annual report "Indvandrere i Danmark 2016". Available at: http://www.statistikbanken.dk/10022 (in Danish only). Statistics are mainly concerned with unemployment-, crime-, and education rates and are not always comparable.

During the past few years', attitudes towards migrants arriving in mixed migration flows through informal or irregular means from non-Western countries in Denmark, Somalis and Afghans included, have changed, and it has become more difficult to obtain asylum in Denmark. At the time of the FGDs for this research (December 2016 to February 2017) the situation for Somalis in Denmark with subsidiary protection status was insecure as a number of residence permits were reviewed by the Danish authorities towards potential revocation and repatriation. This highly sensitive situation most likely influenced the number of informants registered for the research, and might likewise have affected the informants attitude towards new arrivals.

The FGDs were designed to include different groups, these being: newcomers, youth, women and elders. This was done to secure as diverse a voice as possible, taking the relatively small sample into consideration. Out of the 50 participants in the FGDs, 34 were Danish citizens and had permanent residency or had been part of a family reunification programme. The remaining 16 had a temporary residency permit, refugee status or were seeking asylum. Three were at risk of being deported (see more on types of protection status in Denmark in figure below). All interviews were confidential and recordings were deleted after transcription. The FDGs were conducted in Danish, English, Somali and Pasto/Dari – all were translated into English. Interpreters were used for the translation and this research acknowledges that any translation accepts a layer of interpretation. By using native Somali and Afghan speakers, the FGDs managed to capture nuances and expressions.

Based on indicative findings of this study, additional research into the dynamics is recommended.

ASYLUM IN DENMARK
Recent asylum figures[16]
• Over the last decade, asylum figures in Denmark have followed international trends and contexts. Major waves were received in 2014, with 14,792 persons seeking asylum and in 2015, with 21,316 persons seeking asylum – in line with trends elsewhere in Europe linked to the refugee crises in the Mediterranean • 2016 saw a decline to 6,266 asylum applications, declining further in 2017 to 2,254 applications during the first eight months of the year • Afghan asylum seekers peaked in 2015 with 2,331 and 1,127 in 2016 • Somali asylum seekers peaked in 2012 with 919 and dropped significantly year by year with a mere 63 in 2016
Types of protection status [17]
Convention status
• Granted to persons being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (according to Article 1 of the Geneva convention)
Individual temporary protection status
• 1 year temporary residence permit with the option to obtain a permanent residence permit later. Also called De Facto status.
General temporary protection status
• 1 year residence permit without right to apply for family reunification within the first 3 years. If renewed, it will be for 2 years. Only used for Syrians and Somalis so far.
Family Reunification[18]
• With the exception of persons receiving the general temporary protection status, persons being granted asylum in Denmark, will be able to obtain family reunification with her/his close family members who will be allowed to stay in Denmark, in compliance with the European Convention on Human rights article 8 - the right to family life.
Integration[19]
• Municipalities must offer refugees and their families an integration programme after the 2016 integration law's regulations. The aim of the integration programme is to integrate refugees and their families into the Danish labor market and thus become independent providers • Refugees are also obligated to attend levels A1 and A2 Danish language lessons • A person receiving the monthly integration stipend is obliged to take part of the integration programme and be available for the Danish labour market

Integration Stipend in DKK, per month, 2017, before tax[20]	
Single Parent/Provider of child and has the right to child support	12,211
Provider of own child and does not have the right to child support	8,546
Non-providers	6,106
Persons under 30 who stay with their parents and does not provide	2,631
Bonus sum for passed Danish exam in Danish level 2	1,541

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16   Ny i Danmark - Nyeste tal på udlændingeområdet
17   https://flygtning.dk/danmark/asyl/%C3%B8vrig-information-vedroerende-asyl-og-flygtninge/lovgivning-og-konventioner;
18   http://refugees.dk/en/facts/legislation-and-definitions/family-reunification-for-refugees/; https://flygtning.dk/danmark/asyl/%C3%B8vrig-information-vedroerende-asyl-og-flygtninge/lovgivning-og-konventioner;
19   The Danish Integration Ministry: Integration Programme 2017
20   Borger.dk Integrationsydelse 2017

Understanding Mixed Migration

Who Moves Along Mixed Migration Routes?

Mixed migration flows are understood as complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims of trafficking, stranded migrants, etc., who move alongside each other, making use of the same routes and means of transport, and often engaging the services of the same smugglers.[21] The concept of mixed migration is of rising importance, both in terms of numbers and with regard to political significance at national, regional and global levels. This phenomenon reflects the tendencies for an increasing number of people to migrate with greater risks, in search of a better future in more affluent parts of a globalized world.[22] It also indicates that people are on the move for a combination of reasons that are fundamentally related to safeguarding both physical and economic security.

Throughout this paper, people arriving as a part of mixed migration flows are referred to as 'migrants'. As explained above, it is understood that this group comprises a significant proportion of people who are moving not due to economic reasons, but due to protection-related risks associated with conflict and potential loss of life, as well as a significant proportion that may qualify as refugees under the 1957 Refugee Convention. As also already stated, it is important for the understanding of opinions and reflections presented throughout this paper to keep in mind that issues and questions discussed with diaspora informants for this study concerned those moving in mixed migration flows, often through informal or irregular means.

How do people move in mixed migration flows

A significant proportion of migrants in mixed migration flows move outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries, often along informal routes established by smugglers. Smugglers may include a wide range of individuals such as brokers, recruiters, guides, guards, drivers and hotel owners and so forth, and may also include other migrants along the route and those who have reached their destination country.[23] The term 'smuggling' also encompasses different methods that can be categorised as (i) ad hoc smuggling services; (ii) migrant smuggling through misuse or abuse of documents and (iii) pre-organized stage-to-stage smuggling.[24] Smugglers can

also be intermediaries who provide information and advice to potential migrants and people on the move.

Smugglers in the broad sense of the definition can pose a significant risk to migrants: data from DRCs Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4Mi[25]) shows that smugglers are among the most common perpetrators of various types of abuse and protection violations. However, labour migration research indicates that intermediaries including brokers, agents and social networks also help migrants navigate the complex web of immigration policies and procedures including employer sponsorship.[26] It is understood that intermediaries provide not just practical services, but also connections and support.[27]

There is a typically a close relationship between smuggling networks and trafficking networks, however there are clear legal distinction between the two concepts, as defined by the Palermo Protocols (the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air)[28] Smuggling can be defined as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident."[29] Smugglers are often referred to as brokers, and can play the role of travel agent or fixer. Smugglers and migrants enter into a transactional relationship consensually, and migrants can employ smugglers for a part of their journey or for the entire trip.[30] Traffickers, on the other hand, move people from one place to another without their informed consent and exploit them along the way or at their final destination.[31] Migrants can start a journey using smugglers, who later engage in exploitation or abuse; in this case, the migrants experience both trafficking and smuggling along the same route and the lines between formal definitions of trafficking and smuggling blur.[32]

Nevertheless, in this paper, the terms 'smuggling' and 'smuggling networks' are used because the majority of

org/images/DiscussionPapers/Beyond_Definitions.pdf> (last accessed: 12/06/17). RMMS, 2017. Smuggled South: An updated overview of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to southern Africa with specific focus on protections risks, human smuggling and trafficking. Available at: <http://regionalmms.org/images/briefing/Smuggled_South.pdf > (last accessed: 12/06/17).

25   The 4Mi seeks to address the need for data on mixed migration movements by collecting information directly from migrants on the move (as well as from smugglers). Local "monitors" in strategic migration hubs interview migrants on an ongoing basis using smartphones with a survey application. The 4Mi survey touches upon many aspects including profiles of migrants, reasons for migration, means of transport, intentions, protection-related incidents and vulnerabilities, to provide in-depth understanding of migration. The 4Mi project is currently operational along migration routes in West Africa, Libya, East Africa, Southern Africa, Northern Europe and South/South East Asia).

26   See for example Fernandez, 2013. Traffickers, Brokers, Employment Agents, and Social Networks: The Regulation of Intermediaries in the Migration of Ethiopian Domestic Workers to the Middle East. International Migration Review, 47(4).

27   Ambrosini, 2016. While his work refers only to irregular migrants, it can be assumed that his analysis extends to refugees.

28   RMMS (2013). Migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Available at: http://www.regionalmms.org/images/ResearchInitiatives/Migrant_Smuggling_in_the_Horn_of_Africa_and_Yemen._report.pdf (last accessed: 5/07/2017).

29   Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Article 3.

30   http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/global-initiative-human-smuggling-from-the-horn-of-africa-may-2017-web.pdf

31   Human Rights Watch 2017, questions and answers: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/07/smuggling-and-trafficking-human-beings

32   Carling, Gallagher and Horwood, 2015. Beyond Definitions: Global migration and the Smuggling–Trafficking Nexus. Available at: <http://regionalmms.org/images/DiscussionPapers/Beyond_Definitions.pdf> (last accessed: 12/06/17).

21   Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat East Africa and Yemen webpage; available at: http://regionalmms.org/. The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford; available at http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/primers/mixed-migration-policy-challenges/

22   The percentage of migrants as part of the global population has remained relatively constant at 3 % over the past 20+ years. However, this figure reflects only recorded stock migration (numbers of migrants residing in another country) and does not sufficiently include migration flows and irregular migration movements in particular.

23   Tinti and Westcott, 2016. The Niger-Libya Corridor: Smugglers' Perspectives. ISS-Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime Paper No. 299; see also Small Arms Survey. Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/highlights-2014/highlight-sana-dispatch3.html>

24   Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime, 2016. Understanding and Responding to the Role of Human Smugglers in Migration; see also Global Initiative, 2014. Smuggled Futures: The Dangerous Path of the Migrant from Africa to Europe; Carling, Gallagher and Horwood, 2015. Beyond Definitions: Global migration and the Smuggling–Trafficking Nexus. Available at: <http://regionalmms.

migrants in mixed migration flows enter into the networks without coercion. In addition, diaspora respondents in this study, as well as many migrants themselves, refer to smuggling rather than trafficking routes.

Due to the irregular nature of smuggling networks, understanding of information flows and financial flows between migrants and smugglers, facilitators and other parties remains limited. There is a widely held perception that migrants have access to diverse sources of information before departure and en route.[33] It is also widely believed that, in addition to information obtained from smugglers (migration agents, brokers, facilitators etc.), social media and family members, migrants also rely on information or perceptions from diaspora and wider community members.[34]

Mixed migrants from Afghanistan use two primary routes to get to Europe – one consists of movement over land, and the other comprises land and sea components. The land route involves travel through Iran and Turkey, and then an overland route through Bulgaria, into Serbia and then Europe. This route has recently been severely restricted due to harsher border measures in Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries, but it was formerly used primarily by less financially stable single travellers, particularly young men. The sea route involves travel through Iran and Turkey via land, and boat trips from Turkey into Greece and Serbia. Migration routes often start on the border between Iran and Afghanistan, in the town of Zaranj, where potential migrants contact small-scale local smuggling networks, who facilitate their transportation into Iran. Costs depend on the route chosen, the means of transportation, services provided and the migration policies in destination countries. Payment is usually made in instalments for longer routes with payment at agreed milestones. Movement is often an investment, and payment is made using contributions from extended family members.[35]

Migrants and refugees[36] from Somalia mainly travel irregularly along two major routes: North-western towards Europe through Libya and North African countries, and north-eastern through Egypt and Sudan and on to Europe. Both routes involve crossing the Mediterranean Sea on unregulated boats. Many migrants use smugglers to navigate multiple land, sea, and/or air borders to reach their destinations. In recent years, Somalis have been victims of high profile abuse cases as they embark on the journey to Europe through the Sahel, where physical, sexual and physiological abuse is rampant.

Various factors both push and pull migrants from Somalia to Europe. The push factors include political, economic and social factors in the migrants' home countries, including war and conflict, persecution, compulsory military service, lack of employment opportunities, poverty, as well as environmental factors such as drought. At the same time migrants are pulled to destinations where they have family or friends, or perceive the destination country as welcoming and one where employment opportunities are available. Various other factors come into play when migrants are deciding where to travel to, including the funds available for the smuggling journey, the known or perceived conditions and risks on the journey to the destination country, and the perceived or real likelihood that the migrants will be accepted as refugees or be able to secure employment in the destination country. These factors are further influenced by the advice of smugglers and others.

The Diaspora Connection

There is a significant body of research on diasporas, including how they connect to one another, how they relate to their homeland, and their contributions in the economic, political and social spheres. The majority of the research conducted, however, focuses on relationships between diasporas themselves and relationships between diasporas and host communities; there is inadequate research on the link between diaspora and migrants in mixed migration flows, a gap which this paper aims to address.

Diaspora Perceptions of Migrants in Mixed Flows

Diaspora's perceptions of migrants in mixed flows are characterised by conflicting attitudes, concerns about how host country populations will perceive the newcomers and a strong sense of sympathy for the trauma experienced by those who have arrived. Respondents to this study phrased observations of migrants in general terms possibly relating to new arrivals, asylum seekers, recognized refugees and economic migrants alike. Given the framing of questions and topics of discussion during the FGDs, findings and quotes below refer to those on the move in mixed migration flows through informal or irregular means.

Split Loyalties and Conflicting Attitudes

Diaspora communities report conflicting attitudes toward new arrivals. On the one hand, diasporas acknowledge, understand and sympathise with the conditions causing people to move, but on the other hand, they also express concern related to their background. Taken as a whole, focus group responses indicate that diasporas have split

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33   RMMS, 2017. Smuggled South: An updated overview of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to southern Africa with specific focus on protections risks, human smuggling and trafficking. Available at: <http://regionalmms.org/images/briefing/Smuggled_South.pdf > (last accessed: 12/06/17); Frouws, et al, 2016. Getting to Europe the Whatsapp Way: The Use of ICT in Contemporary Mixed Migration Flows to Europe. Nairobi: RMMS; Danish Refugee Council CASWA 4Mi Monthly Reports. Available at: <http://regionalmms.org/index.php/other-regions/central-south-west-asia>

34   Crisp, 1999. Policy Challenges of the New Diasporas: Migrant Networks and Their Impact on Asylum Flows and Regimes. Transnational Communities Programme: Working Paper Series; Ambrosini, 2016. "Why Irregular Migrants Arrive and Remain: the Role of Intermediaries." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.

35   DRC CASWA 4Mi data, in particular 4Mi report February 2017

36   A 'migrant' may be understood as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is. A 'refugee' is person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country". (Art. 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the 'refugee' definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 1(2), 1969, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a 'refugee' as any person compelled to leave his or her country "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality."

loyalties towards migrants moving in mixed migration flows through informal or irregular means.

There is a strong assumption in the European discourse that current mixed migration flows are primarily motivated by economic reasons, but among diaspora groups, there is a clear recognition of the variety of reasons for movement and of the proportion of people within mixed migration flows fleeing live-threatening security situations and persecution.

> " The people are divided in two. First are the ones who are in real dire need of help, or have been persecuted and are fleeing for their safety. On the other hand, there are rent seekers, who actually have the capacity to still stay and live in Somalia, but want the chance to reach Europe."[37]
>
> *Somali respondent*

Regardless of the underlying reason for movement, the respondent diasporas express strong sympathy for their counterparts on the move. This sympathy is based on a feeling that migration occurs due to lack of alternative options, basic services and basic human rights in the country of origin; it can thus reasonably be argued that diasporas recognize in new arrivals the same factors and sentiments that drove their own decisions to migrate.

> " People don't just flee for nothing… we also see it is because they have lost any hope for the country to development inclusion for everyone."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> " So if [people] didn't have a reason to flee, they would prefer to stay in their respective country where they know the culture, have friends and their livelihood, so in the end they wouldn't benefit from fleeing."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

This sympathy for new arrivals is documented, though somewhat sparsely, in literature on diasporas. There is relatively little systematic cross-national research on how the views of 'old', settled migrants toward new arrivals are affected by their migration and integration experience. However, literature from the United States indicates that there is support among foreign-born individuals for immigration and policies that benefit newcomers.[38] Similarly,

a study from the University of Chicago demonstrates through quantitative data that migrants express more positive views about immigration than natives; the researchers posit that, *'this effect is rooted in a variety of considerations; these include kinship and solidarity with other newcomers based on their shared experiences as migrants; a better understanding why people migrate and the physical and psychological difficulties that relocation to a different country involves; instrumental considerations, such as opportunities to bring in their relatives from abroad; as well as cognitive dissonance avoidance that encourages individuals who made the choice to migrate themselves to evaluate that same choice made by others positively.'*[39]

Indeed, as a sign of compassion to new arrivals, diasporas seem to condone attempts to fabricate responses and facts during the asylum process. The solidarity shown by diasporas for new arrivals is generated both by an understanding of the harsh situation in which new arrivals find themselves and a comprehension of the challenges associated with the asylum system. In terms of the context, diasporas realize that migrants face a feeling of desperation.

> " To be frank, if you have spent all your money and savings in reaching Europe, then you are also ready to lie about whatever. But in reality these people … are running for their lives."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> " When it is a matter of life and death I think they should fabricate."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

> " Some do fabricate some part of their stories, but the problem in my opinion that our system has, is that people have to lie because we can't relate to their true experiences, which they have endured."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

The compassion shown by diasporas for migrants is, however, tempered by caution and, in some cases, fear of the new arrivals.

> " I would … say … that the new waves are more destructive than the previous wave"
>
> *Somali respondent*

This divide between old and new migrants has precedent in previous waves of migration, and has been documented as far back as World War II. Among Ukrainian migrants to

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37 For ease of reading, spelling errors in quotes recorded during the Focus Group Discussions have been corrected by the authors of this paper and in some cases the flow of text has been slightly altered, while leaving the meaning of the quote intact and staying as close as possible to the authentic quote.

38 For example: Branton, 2007. "Latino Attitudes towards Various Areas of Public Policy." Political

Research Quarterly 60 (2): 293–303; Polinard, Wrinkle and de la Garza, 1984. "Attitudes of Mexican Americans Toward Irregular Mexican Immigration." International Migration Review 18 (3): 782–899. Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997. "Mexican-American and Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform: A View From the Border." Social Science Quarterly 78: 324-337.

39 Just and Anderson, 2015. "Dual Allegiances? Immigrants' Attitudes Toward Immigration." The Journal of Politics 77 (1): 188-201.

North America, there was a distinct barrier between pre-WWII migrants and post-WWII migrants, with the first wave of migrants patronizing the second wave, due to differences in class and attitudes toward assimilation.[40] Similarly, Sri Lankan (Tamil) immigrants to Switzerland experienced divisions due to class and caste and therefore, *'sought to put some distance between themselves and more recent arrivals.'*[41] Other recent examples of these dynamics of hesitation toward new arrivals include Turkish diaspora in Germany, and Asian, particularly Muslim, arrivals to the US.[42]

The class, education and culture divide between diasporas and new arrivals that is broadly cited by the literature was also evident in the FGDs. Diaspora members also fear that the security conditions in their country of origin may have had an impact on new arrivals who grew up in these conditions. This includes a specific concern about potential links between migrants in mixed flows and criminality, terrorism and armed groups.

> The young people who were born 25 years ago have grown up with war. They have never been to school; they have had a bad upbringing."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

> The wave coming now is mostly youth who grew up with gunfire and explosions every day, and they don't have an education. When I came, the vast majority of refugees or migrants were people who were educated. For example; schoolteachers, mechanics, engineers, lawyers etc."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> People are scared of what the refugees or migrants might have carried with them on their trip to Europe. Now I'm thinking of the young men who are always suspected of being ISIS affiliates or they want to force their culture down upon the Europeans and make Europe Muslim."
>
> *Somali respondent*

The respondents in this study are reflecting an internal conflict: on the one hand, they understand the conditions causing people to leave, but on the other hand, they worry about the new arrivals, both because they differ in background and because of their experiences. The sympathy felt by diasporas for their counterparts is being stretched by social circumstances, and in some cases, also

by their experiences with newly arrived migrants. By and large, the findings from the limited focus groups of this study confirm the findings in broader diaspora literature. They also seem to indicate that migration from a conflict-affected country appears to heighten both sympathy and fear of new arrivals among diaspora communities.

> When the refugees arrive in Denmark, they are very different from us. Most newcomers suffer from PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder]. The other day I spoke with my friend who lives in Kabul. While we talked a bomb exploded in Kabul and she just continued talking. I stopped and said 'sorry I can't talk, let's talk later', but she said 'no let's just continue, that was no big deal'. 20 people died as a result of that attack. I was eating while we talked and I dropped my fork and started to cry. I couldn't talk and couldn't sleep that night. But my friend, who was in the middle of it, didn't seem to bother."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

The Impact of Host Communities

There is a complex relationship between established diasporas, new arrivals and host communities. The attitudes of host country populations, together with national policy in the country of reception, shape the identity of immigrants, with warmer welcomes generating inclusion and cohesion, and cooler attitudes generating reactive identities.[43] Authors pointed out that, 'natives control interactions with outsiders by creating institutional, social, psychological, and spatial mechanisms that delimit immigrants' access to material resources and even social status. Immigrants construct identities based on how they perceive and respond to these social boundaries.'[44] Given this complex interaction, the role played by host communities in shaping attitudes toward new arrivals is significant.

Echoing this literature, diaspora perceptions of ethnic Danes – the context of this study – affect the relationship between diasporas and new arrivals. In general, the Afghan and Somali diaspora members who participated in the FGDs found that ethnic Danes lacked understanding of and compassion or sympathy for migrants. They also found that the trend in attitudes from ethnic Danes toward migrants was worsening.

40   Satzewich, 2003. The Ukrainian Diaspora. Oxford: Routledge.

41   McDowell, 2005. Asylum Diaspora: Tamils in Switzerland in "Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World. Volume I: Overviews and Topics; Volume II: Diaspora Communities" ed Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, Ian Skoggard, 2005.

42   Ibid (different chapters).

43   Fussel, 2014. "Warmth of the Welcome: Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy in the United States." Annual Review of Sociology 40: 479-498. Available at: <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-soc-071913-043325> (last accessed: 12/06/2017); Deaux K. To be an Immigrant. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 2006

44   Massey and Sánchez, 2010. Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

> " The reality is an individual fleeing from a country at war doesn't think about limitations, they only think about making it to the next day for their children's sake, and for their future. I can relate to this because they are my fellow Somali's, I understand that and I can feel their pain. But the ethnic Dane has difficulties relating to that, […] they don't understand."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> " I experience much more racism now than 10 years ago. There is much more focus on 'us' and 'them'…"
>
> *Afghan respondent*

Diasporas are aware that, as a result of these attitudes, there is a strong possibility that they will be scapegoated, with several respondents mentioning this, and discussing particularly the link between a poor economy and scapegoating of foreigners.

In this context, and given the findings of the literature regarding relationships between host communities and diasporas, new arrivals and in particular supposed economic migrants that can be perceived to 'overstretch' a welcoming attitude in host communities, pose a threat: any misbehaviour or inappropriate conduct on behalf of the new arrivals could affect the entire community, including established diasporas who have had long-standing investments in and links with Denmark. Negative perceptions on the side of ethnic Danes could generate restrictions toward migrants that, in turn, would affect older diaspora communities and affect the attitudes of these communities toward new arrivals. This interplay of dynamics may explain why diasporas express a degree of concern that the new arrivals will disrupt the relationship that has been built between longer-standing diasporas and the Danish host community.

Mental Trauma and Mixed Migration

Among both Afghans and Somali diaspora members, there is a strong belief that many of the new arrivals have mental health issues, and that they may not be able to access health care due to cultural restrictions. The literature points out that refugees and migrants are at a much higher risk of mental health issues compared to the general population. PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) appears to be the most prevalent issue, but depression and chronic pain are also serious.[45] According to the literature, exposure to torture is the strongest predictor of symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder among populations affected by mass conflict

and displacement.[46] Given the high rates of exposure to torture along mixed migration routes,[47] it could therefore be assumed that migrants traveling in mixed migration flows, specifically through informal or irregular means may suffer from high rates of mental illness. Moreover, social stigma is a major barrier to accessing appropriate mental health care for migrants.[48]

> " There are a lot who suffer from PTSD, but that is just another taboo. As an Afghan, you don't tell anyone if you suffer from a mental problem, then you will be perceived as mentally ill."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

> " The majority or 90% of the refugees and migrants who reach Europe end up with mental disorders, depression or PTSD. They are all affected in some kind of way."
>
> *Somali respondent*

Diasporas have a clear understanding that social pressure generates a significant amount of stress, and can have detrimental effects for recent arrivals. Social pressure arises both from high expectations among new arrivals themselves, as well as from family and friends back home who expect to benefit from the migration, for example by receiving remittances. The findings of FGDs are consistent with existing literature. Social pressure to send money home through remittance mechanisms is well documented,[49] and there is also literature linking this pressure to the additional mental stress and trauma of separation and dispersal of families during migration.[50]

45   Lindert, Ehrenstein, Priebe, Mielck and Brähler, 2009. "Depression and Anxiety in Labor Migrants and Refugees: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis." Social Science and Medicine 69(2):246-57; Fazel, Wheeler and Danesh, 2005. "Prevalence of Serious Mental Disorder in 7000 Refugees Resettled in Western Countries: a Aystematic Review." Lancet 365(9467):1309-14.

46   Steel, Chey, Silove, Marnane, Bryant and van Ommeren, 2009. "Association of Torture and Other Potentially Traumatic Events with Mental Health Outcomes Among Populations Exposed to Mass Conflict and Displacement: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis." JAMA 302(5):537-49.

47   MSF, 2016. Dying to Reach Europe: Eritreans in Search of Safety. Available at: https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/usa/files/report_dying_to_reach_europe.pdf (last accessed: 26/05/2017); IOM, 2017. IOM Learns of 'Slave Market' Conditions Endangering Migrants in North Africa. Available at: <https://www.iom.int/news/iom-learns-slave-market-conditions-endangering-migrants-north-africa> (last accessed: 26/05/2017). Danish Refugee Council, 2017. 4Mi CASWA monthly summaries January – April 2017. Available at: <http://regionalmms.org/index.php/other-regions/central-south-west-asia> (last accessed: 12/06/2017).

48   Hacker, Anies, Folb and Zallman, 2015. "Barriers to Health Care for Undocumented Immigrants: A Literature Review." Risk Management and Healthcare Policy Journal 2015 (8) 175-183. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2147/RMHP.S70173> (last accessed: 12/06/17).

49   For example: Eversole and Johnson, 2014. "Migrant Remittances and Household Development: An Anthropological Analysis." Journal of Development Studies Research 1(1): 1-15. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21665095.2014.903808> (last accessed: 12/06/2017); Batista & Narciso, 2016. "Migrant Remittances and Information Flows: Evidence From a Field Experiment." The World Bank Economic Review lhw058. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhw058> (last accessed: 12/06/2017); Lacroix, 2016. "The Politics of Remittances: Implications for Development" in Migration and Social Remittances in a Global Europe: Europe in a Global Context, ed Magdalena Nowicka and Vojin Šerbedžija pg 248; Kunz, 2011. The Political Economy of Global Remittances: Gender, Governmentality and Neoliberalism. New York: Routledge; Plasterer, 2011. Transnational Philanthropy: Somali Youth in Canada and Kenya. Research paper no. 222. Geneva: UNHCR. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4e8f08c29.pdf> (last accessed: 12/06/2017).

50   Savic, Chur-Hansen, Mahmood & Moore, 2013. "Separation from Family and its Impacts on the Mental Health of Sudanese Refugees in Australia: a Qualitative Study." Australia and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 34(4): 383-388. Available at: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1753-6405.12088/full> (last accessed: 13/06/2017); Warfa et al, 2012. "Migration Experiences, Employment Status and Psychological Distress among Somali Immigrants: a Mixed-Method International Study." BMC Public Health 12:749. Available at: <https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-12-749> (last accessed: 13/06/2017); For example: Carrasco, 2010. "Transnational Family Life among Peruvian Migrants in Chile: Multiple Commitments and the Role of Social Remittances." Journal of Comparative Family Studies 41(2):187-204. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41604350> (last accessed: 13/06/17).

> " Whenever a young person gets asylum in Denmark, their families in Afghanistan have huge expectations to them. They expect them to send a lot of money because all family members have invested in the journey. This causes a lot of psychological pressure. Some even commit suicide. And the families in Afghanistan don't understand."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

Lack of social structures and safety nets also generates trauma for new arrivals, potentially exacerbated by the fact that both Afghan and Somali culture is based on tightly knit social structures. The quotes from the FGDs below reflect broader literature on diasporas and mental trauma. Social isolation is quoted as a factor in mental trauma among refugees by the World Health Organization (WHO),[51] and one study commented that, 'separation from family represents a significant barrier to positive psychological outcomes for refugees.'[52]

> " As long as I have lived, for 28 or 29 years, I have never been away from my family, other than during this time. However, when the unfortunate incidents happened in my life, I had to leave my heart behind."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

> " We are people who love being around family and friends, we don't like to live alone; it is like prison for us."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

Conditions in asylum centres cause additional mental challenges for new arrivals. This tendency, pointed out in the FGDs, is supported by the wider literature; residency in an asylum centre, 'contributed independently to risk of ongoing PTSD, depression and mental health-related disability. Longer detention was associated with more severe mental disturbance, an effect that persisted for an average of 3 years after release.'[53]

> " When they arrive at the asylum centres it gets harder for them. They get stressed or depressed while waiting for an asylum grant. They get challenged psychologically, because their expectations were very different to the situation they actually ended up being in."
>
> *Somali respondent*

Diasporas have a strong understanding of the mental stress associated with arrival, with asylum centres, and with family expectations. This understanding, and in some cases the memory of their own personal experiences, may help to encourage empathy for recent arrivals.

The Role of Diasporas in Mixed Migration: Reluctant Facilitators?

Diasporas experience internal tension in their attitudes toward irregular mixed migration flows and recent arrivals. These tensions are exacerbated by the role they play, often reluctantly, in facilitating irregular migration. As discussed above, the exact role of the diasporas in migration, and their perceptions of the issue, remains under-researched, and this paper represents only a first attempt to conduct primary research about this link. Thus, as also stated in the introduction to this paper, the qualitative data analysed here is not definitive and only represents perceptions of a relatively small group limited to two geographic settings. However, what this study clearly does is indicate relevant areas for further research and discussion.

Trust and Reputation: Information Flows

Despite above reflection that the specific role of diasporas in migration trends in under-researched, there is a general assumption that they have a strong role in providing information to potential migrants: links between diasporas and those at home theoretically generate conversations about routes, risks and experiences.[54] However, the qualitative data collected through this research suggests that there are barriers to communication between potential or actual migrants and diasporas. Communication between diasporas and migrants as expressed in the FGDs is characterized by two dynamics: (1) there is limited communication about migration before the journey starts, despite any ongoing communication about other matters, and (2) diaspora messages about conditions in Europe are not always considered reliable by (potential) migrants.

51   WHO, 2017. Migrant populations, Including Children, at Higher Risk of Mental Health Disorders. Available at: <http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-determinants/migration-and-health/news/news/2017/04/migrant-populations,-including-children,-at-higher-risk-of-mental-health-disorders> (last accessed: 13/06/17).

52   Li, Liddell and Nickerson, 2016. "The Relationship Between Post-Migration Stress and Psychological Disorders in Refugees and Asylum Seekers." Current Psychiatry Reports 18(9):82. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11920-016-0723-0> (last accessed: 13/06/17).

53   Steel et al, 2005. "Impact of Immigration Detention and Temporary Protection on the Mental Health of Refugees." The British Journal of Psychiatry 188 (1): 58-64. Available at: <http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/188/1/58> (last accessed: 13/06/17).

54   Frouws et al, 2016. Getting to Europe the Whatsapp Way: The Use of ICT in Contemporary Mixed Migration Flows to Europe. Nairobi: RMMS. Available at http://www.regionalmms.org/images/briefing/Social_Media_in_Mixed_Migration.pdf; Crisp, 1999. Policy challenges of the New Diasporas: Migrant Networks and their Impact on Asylum Flows and Regimes. Transnational Communities Programme: Working Paper Series; Jacobsen, Robinson and Lijnders, 2013. Ransom, Collaborators, Corruption: Sinai Trafficking and Transnational Networks, A Case Study of the Eritrean Migration System from Eritrea to Israel. Medford: Feinstein International Center. Available at: <http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Ransom-Collaborate-Corrupt-8-12.pdf> (last accessed: 13/06/17).

Lack of Communication between Potential Migrants and Diasporas

Migrants rely on a wide communication network comprising social media (e.g. Facebook, Instagram) as well as mobile phone communication. Even during movement, migrants have access to telephones, though sometimes intermittently; given that there is strong evidence that when migrants are robbed (by smugglers, bandits, other migrants and in some cases state officials) their phones are among the first items to be taken. Respondents indicated that maintaining communication was high on the priority list of migrants, and that they are willing to purchase or borrow phone access. Increasingly expanding mobile phone networks and coverage provides migrants with the infrastructure required to maintain links with communities at home, smugglers, diasporas and other migrants on the move.[55]

Despite the possibilities for communication, many respondents commented that migrants rarely communicate with diaspora about migration routes and risks before departure. This was a common finding among both Afghan and Somali respondents.

> They never call if they want some advice before they flee. They only contact us when they are on the road, and when it is most convenient for them."
>
> *FGD respondent*

This lack of communication before departure has some precedent in literature: a study conducted by the Rift Valley Institute into Somali migration, or tahriib, also indicates that youth leave quickly, rely on social media information, and do not necessarily independently verify (including with diaspora groups) the information they receive from smugglers and/or social media.[56] Diaspora members in the FGDs identified two reasons why migrants did not contact them:

Strong Smuggler Network. Smugglers are the most significant source of information for migrants and families, particularly before departure. This relationship appeared to hold, not only before departure, but also along the route. Even in situations of emergency, smugglers are the first point of contact. This is consistent with data from other sources, which indicates that migrants search for 'good' smugglers, but then develop full reliance on them, including on the information they provide.[57] Respondents participating

in the FGDs conducted for this study considered the role played by smugglers in providing information to be a conscious strategy. Smugglers monopolise communication with potential migrants before departure, with the aim of ensuring that migrants do not have options of seeking advice from diaspora or family members.

> You never hear that they are fleeing before they call you, the smugglers are so good, that they also encourage the refugees to not call before the 'point of no return', so that is also a big factor that isn't talked so much about."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> The smugglers really know what they are doing, they seduce young men and women who are enrolled in school, and those who already want to flee, without paying up front."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> When I left, it was mostly the smugglers telling us which countries are good and which are bad. [...] And the rumours go quite fast. And that is how people start travelling. I think people use the smugglers as guides all the time".
>
> *Afghan respondent*

Diasporas Discourage Migration. Diasporas believe that their negative attitudes toward and comments about migration, as well as their attempts to discourage potential migrants from embarking on the journey, reduce the degree of contact they have with them.

> The problem is that, normally, we are not contacted before they have already left Afghanistan. This is because they know we encourage them to stay in Afghanistan."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

> I tell them, if you come for money, then don't come. It is not like what you think it is."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> [Diaspora] share a lot of information with them, like for example the challenges in Europe, and the dangers they might face on the journey to Europe."
>
> *Somali respondent*

55   Ibid.
56   Rift Valley Institute, 2016. Going on Tahriib; The Causes and Consequences of Somali Youth Migration to Europe. Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute. Available at: http://riftvalley.net/publication/going-tahriib#.WcJqmvMjG70
57   McMahon & Sigona, 2016. Boat Migration Across the Central Mediterranean: Drivers, Experiences and Responses. MEDMIG Research Brief no.3. Available at: < http://www.medmig.info/research-brief-03-Boat-migration-across-the-Central-Mediterranean> (last accessed: 13/06/17).

> The advice I give my family and friends down in Somalia is that they shouldn't migrate, and that they should be pleased with what Allah have given then down in Somalia."
>
> *Somali respondent*

Lack of Trust in Diasporas

Diaspora members consistently noted that there is a lack of trust among migrants in advice provided by diasporas. This was discussed across different diaspora groups, and it was an opinion that was prevalent among both Somalis and Afghans:

> What we then tell them, that there is nothing in what they are seeking to find in Europe. They are reluctant and will not listen to what we have to say until they have experienced it on their own,"
>
> *Somali respondent*

Respondents also pointed out that potential migrants who are still in their home countries reacted strongly to negative or discouraging messages from diaspora members:

> The ones that I communicate with through telephone or social media are my close family, and I'm not good friends with them because I've been in strong opposition of them fleeing to Europe. As said before they are not willing to take advice from me, and they usually hang up on me when the conversation gets heated."
>
> *Somali respondent*

This lack of trust in diaspora opinions is, according to FGD discussions, driven by two primary factors. The first concerns conflicting images portrayed of Europe, and the second concerns credibility of the information source.

Conflicting Images of Europe. Although diasporas seek, according to their own accounts, to provide accurate information on the risks of migration, their information is contradicted by positive images of Europe portrayed by recent arrivals and other sources. The positive images of Europe can be based in a desire to 'brag', but it is also possible that these images are disseminated out of a sense of appreciation for the effort others made to help them travel, out of concern or through family loyalty.

> When a person arrives in Europe he or she has the habit of taking a picture of themselves in front of big fancy cars or houses, which they send to Somalia, to brag about their new living standards. The individuals, who see the picture, are easily convinced."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> If I move to Europe and my mother calls me I wouldn't dare tell her how things went bad or if I was living under a bridge. Of course I would please her and tell her that I live in a nice apartment. Just so that she knows I'm happy. Another reason for this is because among Afghans 'pride and dignity' are considered important, and if they hear someone is living under a bridge it would be embarrassing and a shame for them."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

These findings are tangentially supported by other research such as The Rift Valley Institute study which mentions peer-pressure as a driving force for Somali migration, and focuses on the role of recent arrivals in presenting idealistic pictures of the West.

Credibility of Information Source. In the focus group discussions, many participants expressed the opinion that potential migrants and those already en route would not listen to advice from diasporas due to a sense that diasporas are now secure and therefore no longer understand the situation at home; that advice from diasporas is not to be trusted because they are already resident in Europe, that they 'have made it'.

> They don't believe in us when we tell them not to go. They say 'you made it, you have been in Denmark for 14 years. You don't understand our situation, our life in Afghanistan is very unsecure'... All they can think of is that our future is secure unlike theirs."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

> To be frank it doesn't matter for them what you say about the challenges or risks when reaching the shores of Europe. They always say "Of course the risks are bigger, but you are still there right? You don't have to be in an unstable region with bullets and suffering on everyday basis."
>
> *Somali respondent*

The idea that diasporas are a less credible source of information because they have security appears to be partially caused by misunderstanding between established diasporas and new arrivals. Diasporas recognise that there is an element of truth to migrant perceptions of advice given by diasporas. The cultural gap, and the lack of comprehension, between diasporas and potential migrants arises from changes in the situation in the home country over time, and lack of ability of diasporas to maintain full understanding of this situation.

> There are comprehension problems between the diaspora and Afghans in Afghanistan. We don't understand their situation and they don't understand ours. So, we tell them not to go but they come anyway."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

> We discourage those who call us with the intent to reach Denmark or Europe. We don't want them to take the dangerous journey. Again we can't relate to them, the current situation is different to when we arrived. We have been away from Afghanistan for so long, and I sometimes ask myself if we can properly judge their situation? I don't think so. It is a difficult decision. We can only relate to what we see on TV."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

The challenges diasporas appear to face in making their situation, and the difficulties they face, understood may be closely linked to a culture of migration prevalent in varying levels among both Somali and Afghan communities. This culture of migration consists of peer pressure, exerted by both friends and family, to migrate. Migration is associated with personal, social and material success, while staying at home is associated with failure.[58] When the culture of migration is strong, then individual voices may find themselves alone; it may be difficult for individual diaspora members to make their point strongly and act against a culture that is both entrenched and distanced from the diaspora member.

> If I were in Afghanistan and knew how dangerous it is to flee, I would never do it. It is a matter of life and death. [But when we] explain the dangers to people in Afghanistan, they don't understand. I know a family in Germany, they used to have a very good life in Afghanistan. They fled because their children were kidnaped several times. The family had more money than the average and that's why their children were kidnaped. They had to flee. Both parents were doctors before they left. Now, in Germany, none of them can work as doctors. The father has lost the respect he used to have in Afghanistan. Now, he is nothing. This affects the family a lot. All he wants is to go back to his old life and Afghanistan. We tell them this. It is not easy in Europe, especially if you are an adult. You will have to work really hard to get a job and to get integrated. But they don't understand. They say it can't be that difficult."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

Diasporas face the paradoxical situation of trying to alert potential migrants to risks and pitfalls, but either (a) receive information about departure too late, or (b) are considered untrustworthy or illegitimate because they already have a life in Europe. They are very conscious of this paradox, and common challenges of communicating with potential and actual migrants were mentioned in all FGDs, across both Somalis and Afghans.

Diaspora Attitudes toward Financial Support

Diaspora members regularly send remittances to their home countries, but the degree to which they directly provide financial support for migration journeys remains unclear. Data from this research indicates that diaspora do facilitate journeys, but do not do so in a planned way. Instead, they provide financial support under duress, because family members have been kidnapped or held hostage by smugglers. They do so against their will and with severe financial limitations. The findings from the FGDs thus support existing research on how human smuggling is financed and the role of diasporas in this process.

The attitude of most respondents, both Afghans and Somalis, to provision of financial support for migration was clear – they would not support migrants before departure, but would pay under extreme circumstances.

58   RMMS, 2014. Blinded by Hope; Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Ethiopian Migrants. Nairobi: RMMS; De Haas, 2006. The Social and Cultural Impacts of International Migration on Moroccan Sending Communities: A Review. In Bos, P.H.F. and Fritschy, W. (eds.), Morocco and the Netherlands: Society, Economy, Culture. Amsterdam: VU University Press.

> " We don't want to send money directly to the smugglers, but in some cases life forces us, because if the migrants are kept by the smuggler in bad conditions, it may be a question of life or death."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> " It's hard to say no to them when they are undertaking the journey… because then you kind of feel it is your fault if something bad happens to them during the journey, but if they call from Afghanistan then I usually say no."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

This reluctance to provide financial support for the journey may be linked to diaspora understanding of the high risks along the route, but also appears to be driven by financial limitations.

> " Yes, economically we could support [irregular migrants] a little, but when the word gets around to other Afghans, then we simply just can't afford it."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

Somalis echoed this sentiment.

> " Somalis echoed this sentiment, saying that, "to be honest there is almost nothing left to send back home when it comes to your own mother, brothers and sisters. Sometime you can't even manage to send it back to your parents."
>
> *Somali respondent*

The decision to remit money, or to contribute to the costs of migration, is often due to social pressure. Most respondents agreed that social pressure was instrumental in a diaspora member's decision to provide support. This factor appeared to be particularly prevalent among the Somali respondents; fewer Afghans mentioned social pressure as a push factor for financial support.

> " There was a request for 5,000 dollars, and they asked me to pay 2,000 dollars of that. I know it is a lot of money, but then the clan structure and all the ideological thoughts about how we Somalis stick together and help each other came out, and was threatening to give me a bad 'rep' amongst the Somali community if I didn't pay. Today I don't even have 200 dollars to spend on groceries, let along buy new clothes for my children."
>
> *Somali respondent*

The strong social pressure for diaspora members to remit money home, or to contribute to family members, is well known.[59] Recently, researchers have also begun to investigate the social dynamics behind provision of remittances. It has been suggested that remittance provision occurs according to certain underlying structures, known as scripts. Twelve scripts have been proposed, two of which are 'obligation' and 'help'. In the 'obligation' script, the diaspora member is obliged to support family and, more importantly, there is a sense of entitlement on behalf of the receiver. In the 'help' script, the diaspora member feels that the recipient has worthy needs, and that there is a moral imperative to help. The qualitative data collected in of the current research indicates that migrants are relying on both the 'obligation' and the 'help' script to gain financial support from diasporas.[60]

Facilitating Migration under Duress

Smuggling networks have long employed extortion and coercion techniques to extract money from diasporas. The use of violence among smugglers has been confirmed by recent research both along the route and in Europe.[61] Extortion is also common; for the Afghan migration route, being held for ransom by smugglers is the second most common form of abuse experienced by migrants, which, as discussed earlier in this paper, shows how thin the line between smuggling and trafficking is.[62] Among Eritreans, as well, 'refugees are often kidnapped, tortured, raped, and held captive until they, their families, or members and organisations of their diaspora are able to pay the ransom demanded.[63] Similarly, for Ethiopian migrants, 75% are kidnapped for ransom in Yemen.[64] The high prevalence of extortion is clear throughout existing literature on migration in both the Horn of Africa and the Afghan migration route.[65]

The prevalence of extortion was confirmed by the diaspora FGD participants. The Somali respondents, in particular, were clear that smugglers extort diasporas. The respondents believe that smugglers' and traffickers' threats

59   For example: Batista & Narciso, 2016. "Migrant Remittances and Information Flows: Evidence from a Field Experiment." The World Bank Economic Review lhw058. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhw058> (last accessed: 13/06/2017); Eversole and Johnson, 2014. "Migrant Remittances and Household Development: an Anthropological Analysis." Journal of Development Studies Research 1(1): 1-15. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21665095.2014.903808> (last accessed: 13/06/2017); Lacroix, 2016. "The Politics of Remittances: Implications for Development" in Migration and Social Remittances in a Global Europe: Europe in a Global Context, ed Magdalena Nowicka and Vojin Šerbedžija pg 248; Kunz, 2011. The Political Economy of Global Remittances: Gender, Governmentality and Neoliberalism. New York: Routledge; Plasterer, 2011. Transnational Philanthropy: Somali Youth in Canada and Kenya. Research paper no. 222. Geneva: UNHCR. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4e8f08c29.pdf> (last accessed: 13/06/2017).

60   Carling, 2014. "Scripting Remittances: Making Sense of Money Transfers in Transnational Relationships." International Migration Review 48: S218–S262. Available at: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/imre.12143/full> (last accessed: 13/06/17).

61   Crawley et al, 2016. Destination Europe? Understanding the Dynamics and Drivers of Mediterranean Migration in 2015. Available at: < www.medmig.info/research-brief-destination-europe.pdf> (last accessed: 13/06/17); also Danish Refugee Council, 2017. CASWA 4Mi February 2017 report "Smuggling Networks." Available at: <http://regionalmms.org/caswa/Regional%20Migration%20Trends%20February%202017.pdf > (last accessed: 13/06/2017).

62   Danish Refugee Council CASWA 4Mi Monthly Reports. Available at: <http://regionalmms.org/index.php/other-regions/central-south-west-asia>

63   Aziz, Monzini and Pastore, 2015. The Changing Dynamics of Cross-Border Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the Mediterranean. Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).

64   RMMS, 2014. Blinded by Hope: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Ethiopian Migrants. Nairobi: RMMS

65   RMMS, 2017. Smuggled South: An updated overview of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to southern Africa with specific focus on protections risks, human smuggling and trafficking. Available at: <http://regionalmms.org/images/briefing/Smuggled_South.pdf > (last accessed: 13/06/17); RMMS, 2013. Migrant Smuggling in the Horn of Africa and Yemen: The Political Economy and Protection Risks. Nairobi: RMMS; RMMS, 2014. Going West: Contemporary Mixed Migration Trends from the Horn of Africa to Libya and Europe. Nairobi: RMMS.

are legitimate, and speak openly about the perceived costs associated with lack of compliance.

> I've been contacted by people standing on the shores of northern Africa waiting for the boat. Also people calling from within the boats and their questions are only demands. They require that we send them money, always. It is not always the Somali person fleeing who calls, but also smugglers trying to press family members out of money, so they don't get thrown overboard or even worse."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> If the family in Somalia doesn't pay, they torture or cut off a small part of the refugee's body."
>
> *Somali respondent*

According to FGD respondents, the attitude of the diasporas – that financial support will only be made available under duress – has been instrumentalised by smugglers.

> Migrants only contact you, when they are held as hostages by the smugglers or worse, but they know that they won't receive money if they are not in a dangerous situation. Those are the rules of the game, because they know us in Europe or Denmark won't help otherwise."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> They use transit countries as for example Yemen …where the smugglers are based. They detain them in big numbers and with different nationalities. Each nationality tends to mobilize and they then call back to Somalia or Europe to ask for money, so they can continue their journey."
>
> *Somali respondent*

In some cases, not only have smugglers blackmailed diaspora members, but they have then diverted the money. This subject was not extensively discussed during the FGDs, but two examples of diversion were provided, one by a Somali and one by an Afghan.

> There are a lot of cases where the family do send the required money, but the family member ends up missing. I don't know if the individual himself scams the family or if the smugglers already had killed him. Usually this happens if the family are slow in paying the ransom. These cases have been going on for many years now."
>
> *Somali respondent*

> Yes, it is a lot of money, and usually when it comes to those figures, we collect the money in our community in Denmark, but what I've experienced lately is that the money don't always reach the ones who are asking for it. It gets channelled in all sorts of directions, and that it will not be used for the purpose it was supposed for. Then they will call again and ask where the money went?"
>
> *Somali respondent*

Obligations and Repercussions for Diaspora Communities

Diasporas are caught in a dilemma with their relations with (potential) migrants. They perceive that it is their responsibility to inform them about the risks along the route, but they feel their ability to do so is restricted because they are not considered to be credible sources of information since they have already achieved security and are now warning others not to migrate. Similarly, they perceive that it is not their role to financially support movement, but they are compelled to do so both by financial obligations and also by moral and humanitarian obligations. Being placed in this situation – between the West and their countries of origin, not fully trusted by either – generates both obligations and repercussion for diasporas.

> When I was in Kabul 2 years ago, a cab driver kept asking me about how his son could reach Europe, and which routes were best. I said he should not send his son over there, because his son was an engineer and had a good job in Afghanistan, but then I recently heard that the son died in a car explosion in Kabul City. I can't [stop] thinking about if I should have advised the father otherwise, and that it was maybe my fault, that the son died."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

Significant financial obligations exist for diasporas. Both Afghans and Somalis consider that it is their obligation to send money home, and because they are in Europe, families expect large amounts of money.

> I send a lot of cash to Afghanistan. If I work, I have some money. It's not monthly, but if one of my friends or relatives needs money I send. I just send my brother money to cover half of his wedding costs, so I worked a lot to send that money back. So, if there is a wedding or a ceremony where they need money I will send them if they ask for it."
>
> *Afghan respondent*

> My contact with communities in Somalia is basically only a financial support issue. They live on my support."

Somali respondent

> They expect that we send the money because we live in Europe. They think that money hangs on the trees here in Europe."

Afghan respondent

Despite the large role finance plays in fulfilling obligations, other factors are also important. In particular, diasporas provide moral and practical support, which is seen among diaspora members as the most effective form of aid to new arrivals. Findings from the focus group discussion confirm existing literature on migrant networks, indicating that migrants use social networks to support economic, social and other integration. Migrant networks help new arrivals to find jobs, access services and maintain links with their home countries.[66]

> I've helped some individual at the asylum center too, but it is limited what you can do, but if you show up and show them support, that is the most important. Moral support."

Afghan respondent

> I make a big effort in inviting them over to my place or socially engage with them. I think our generation are much more reserved when it comes to that point. We have adapted a little too much of the Danish culture I must say."

Somali respondent

> I recall we had an uncle who came to live with us for a period of time, because he didn't want to live at the asylum center that was close to our city. We helped him with job interviews and he actually got better at speaking Danish, because he was around us kids all the time. He also got more positive about life, because he felt inclusive, not just in the society and in our household, but he felt he mattered."

Somali respondent

The Future of Migration: What Role do Diasporas play?

The Future of Migration

FGD respondents perceive that mixed migration flows will be a continuing trend, due to various push and pull factors and due to smuggling networks facilitating or sometimes actively encouraging migration. There is an overall sense among the respondent diaspora members that migration is inevitable, largely due to the global context. RMMS's analysis of migration drivers as presented in The *Perfect Storm*[67] identifies three major forces that underlie movements. These are (1) a world of disparity, characterised by structural inequalities with regard to poverty, demography and development, (2) global vectors, referring to existing networks of diaspora, remittances, employment networks and ICT and (3) 'riding the storm', referring to the set of deeply entrenched existing policy paradigms and the constraints of the multilateral system to address such a sprawling and rapidly evolving phenomenon.

The analysis in *The Perfect Storm* was echoed in the focus groups, with respondents focusing both on the disparity, as a reason for departure, and the global vectors, in particular the smuggling routes. As a result of both the structural inequalities and the increasing prevalence of smuggling groups, migration flows are seen as inevitable among focus group respondents.

> The smuggling routes will never be closed. For as long as I remember and as long as I have lived, I have always heard that somebody has travelled to Europe irregularly and through smuggling routes. Smuggling is a good business …. It is not only the smugglers that earn, there are more people and even governments and banks that make profit from this."

Somali respondent

> Personally I don't think the refugee crisis could be solved, because they will always find new routes that will bring them to Europe. They know that peace and prosperity can be found in Europe, and that is not something that they would give up easily."

Somali respondent

Despite the fact that smugglers engage in coercion and human rights violations, some respondents expressed ambivalence towards the smugglers, and an understanding that they fill a gap.

66   For instance: Poros, 2011. Migrant Social Networks: Vehicles for Migration, Integration and Development. Available at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migrant-social-networks-vehicles-migration-integration-and-development> (last accessed: 13/06/2017); Giuletti et al, 2011. Migrants and Social Networks: Old Ideas, Lasting Myths and new Findings. Available

67   Horwood and and Reitano, 2016. The Perfect Storm? Forces Shaping Modern Migration and Displacement. Nairobi: RMMS. Available at: <http://regionalmms.org/images/DiscussionPapers/A_Perfect_Storm.pdf> (last accessed: 13/06/2017).

> " The [whole issue with smugglers] is a bit ambivalent to me. If they aren't there, who should then help the irregular migrants reach Europe? At the same time, they harass and mistreat [them]."
>
> *Afghana respondent*

What can Diasporas Do?

Diasporas do consider that they have a role in informing and improving the protection environment for (potential) migrants. Specific examples that were discussed of the role they can play include:

Provision of information: Despite the fact that focus groups indicated that diasporas may not be a fully credible source of information for potential migrants, there is still a strong feeling among the diaspora members themselves that they have untapped potential to distribute information. Provision of information could take place at several levels: (i) Diasporas could interact directly with home communities, or there could be an intermediary, in the form of an NGO or in the form of local community facilitators (traditional elders, religious leaders, other trusted actors); (ii) diasporas could also be offered trainings and seminars in relevant rules and procedures, enabling to pass on accurate and relevant information on destination country asylum systems, reception mechanisms, etc. A structured project in which several approaches were piloted across both communities to test effectiveness may help to nurture approaches which overcome the distrust between diasporas and (potential) migrants.

Transfer of skills: The issue was raised of the relevance of diaspora members with relevant technical skills supporting origin countries in fields where appropriately qualified professionals aren't available (health was mentioned as a particularly relevant field). Supporting skills transfer from diaspora members with particular expertise has generally been proven relevant by projects such as IOM's Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA), Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) and Connecting Diaspora for Development (CD4D),[68] UNDP's Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), as well as the Returning Experts programme of the German Center for International Migration and Development (CIM).[69] These projects could be adapted to other countries and contexts.

Infrastructure investments: Infrastructure investment was raised in the focus groups as a potential avenue for diasporas to contribute to the development of their home countries. Diasporas perceive that infrastructure investments would help to create a conducive environment in their home countries, reducing the perception of inequality between home and destination countries and reducing push factors. Such investments have taken place in Somalia, and have demonstrated positive effects. In particular, diasporas can leverage 'ethnic advantage, altruism, homeland orientation'[70] in developing infrastructure. However, such infrastructure investments are fraught with challenges in fragile states – diaspora investment may affect balances of power in local communities; employment from infrastructure construction may not be distributed in a fair fashion and even the location of the infrastructure may not be neutral. Nonetheless, in an appropriate structure, and with analysis and safeguards, investment in infrastructure may be an appropriate diaspora response and help to create viable alternatives to unsafe, irregular migration.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to analyse the links between diaspora groups and migrants moving in mixed migration flows through informal or irregular means, based on desk research and primary data from focus group discussions and a survey. The results of the analysis can only be seen as preliminary, given the limited number of focus groups conducted as a part of this research, and a general lack of analysis in the literature about the possible connections between diaspora groups and mixed migration flows.

Nonetheless, the paper generates interesting indicative findings, and directions for future research. There are two major categories to the findings:

1) The relationship between diasporas and migrants in mixed flows is complex, and appears to be characterised by conflicting emotions. Diasporas have strong sympathy for the migrants and their journeys, particularly in light of the deterioration of conditions in their countries of origin. However, this same deterioration has given rise to factors that decrease trust in new arrivals, including possible perceived higher levels of violence and prevalence of extremist and/or criminal groups. The dynamics between diasporas and migrants could be further investigated as a two-way process of i) diaspora groups influencing migration – fuelling migration by signalling success, creating aspirations, opportunities for family reunification, financing migration, etc. as well as trying to discourage migration by warning potential migrants about the dangers of migration; and ii) migration influencing the diasporas – including aspects such as competition over jobs between diasporas and new arrivals, pressure from potential migrants on diasporas to help them migrate, and rise of anti-migration sentiments because of large inflow of new migrants, which affects the already established diasporas.

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68   http://quests-mida.org/index.php/pages/about-mida; http://www.iom-nederland.nl/en/migration-and-development/temporary-return (project ended in 2016); http://www.connectingdiaspora.org/en/about/.

69   http://www.cimonline.de/en/61.asp

70   Gillespie, Riddle, Sayre, et al, 1999. "Diaspora Interest in Homeland Investment." Journal of International Business Studies 30(3):623-634. Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490087> (last accessed: 13/06/17); Building Bridges, UNDP

Any future research should also add a temporal dimension: analysis should take into account the length of time diaspora groups have been resident in destination countries.

2) Flows of information and money between diasporas and migrants are not necessarily taking place as anticipated. It appears, from this preliminary research, that while the Afghan and Somali diasporas have limited communication with migrants prior to the journey, they do provide financial support under duress – when persons on the move are in acute need of financial support to save their lives. These economic flows need further analysis and research.

The Afghan and Somali diasporas contributing to this study believe that they have untapped potential, and that their experiences can support an improved protection environment for people on the move in mixed migration flows through informal or irregular means. They suggested particular areas of collaboration that may be fruitful, such as engagement towards improving conditions in countries of origin as well as diasporas' role in improving information flows and working with other actors such as NGOs. There is room for more – and more constructive – engagement with diaspora groups to better understand their roles in mixed migration flows and cooperate to improve the protection environment of people on the move.

REGIONAL MIXED MIGRATION SECRETARIAT (RMMS)

Formed in 2011 and based in Nairobi, the overall objective of the RMMS is to support agencies, institutions and fora in the Horn of Africa and Yemen sub-region to improve the management of protection and assistance to people in mixed migration flows in the Horn of Africa and across the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea in Yemen. The Steering Committee members for the RMMS include UNHCR, IOM, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), INTERSOS, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, IGAD, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Union. The RMMS is a regional hub aiming to provide information and data management; analysis and research; support and coordination; and support to policy development and dialogue. It acts as an independent agency, hosted by the DRC, to stimulate forward thinking and policy development in relation to mixed migration. Its overarching focus and emphasis is on human rights, protection and assistance.

Cover photo: © © Mikkel Ostergaard | Immigrant family in Copenhagen, Denmark.
See our websites www.regionalmms.org and http://4mi.regionalmms.org
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Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
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Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA

NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
DANIDA | INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

german cooperation
DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT

RMMS Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
EAST AFRICA AND YEMEN

DRC DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL